

L) A Planet Unto Itself

KosMet is not a large area. It's about 10,000 square kilometres, which is smaller than Yorkshire in the UK and less than half the size of New Jersey in the U.S. Dr Ball divides this already small area even further, into 29 unequal areas, the municipalities. He then treats each municipality as a planet unto itself, completely separate from other neighbouring municipalities.

If one municipality is carpet bombed incessantly for days on end and the KLA are launching all out assaults on Yugoslav positions he assumes that ethnic Albanians who live just across the municipality border are not affected in the slightest by the death and destruction a couple or so kilometres down the road.

Is this a realistic?



Kosovo's municipalities

These municipalities really are small. Even if you're living right in the middle of one of the larger municipalities you're still less than 10 kilometres from a neighbouring municipality. Pristina, the capital of Kosovo where a quarter of the Kosovo's entire population live, rests on the western tip of the municipality so any bombing west of the city, in Obilic or Kosovo Polje, would be in a different municipality.

As a resident of Pristina you'd see the bombs fall, feel the ground shake, see and smell the smoke, hear the police and ambulance sirens and hear of the casualties on the local grapevine, but because it happened in a different municipality, a few hundred metres away to the west, Doctor Ball would claim

that this horrific experience would have no effect whatsoever on any decision to leave.



Pristina being bombed. If you viewed this from a neighbouring municipality it would have absolutely no effect on making you leave because there is an invisible municipality boundary between you and the inferno.

M) Tomorrow Never Comes

The analysis also assumes that ethnic Albanians are incapable of basing their actions on what might possibly happen in the future. According to Doctor Ball, ethnic Albanians are only capable of reacting to events and incapable of reading a situation and basing their behaviour on what might or may happen.

For example, ethnic Albanians hear that a large group of KLA terrorists who have entered the municipality and are planning on attacking the Yugoslav forces. They wisely decide to leave before all hell breaks loose. Sure enough a few days later, the KLA and Yugoslav forces do start to fight. Doctor Ball would conclude that the ethnic Albanians left for some other so far undetermined reason. They couldn't possibly have left because of the battle because that occurred the following week.

He doesn't think too highly of them.



People leaving home just days before hurricane Katrina hits. They cannot possibly be leaving because of the impending hurricane as it is still in the Gulf of Mexico. There simply must be a different reason.

The same with regards to NATO attacks. It's common sense that NATO would target Yugoslav forces and NATO spokesmen did talk endlessly of targeting Yugoslav barracks, troop concentrations, etc.

Defence Counsel: "If people live in a village that has a Yugoslavia army barracks in that village and the information that's communicated to them is that NATO is bombing Yugoslav Army installations, it seems to me they must consider that information and one of the things they may decide to do based upon that information is leave the village. If that installation -- and they did that, they left the village. If that installation was then bombed, say, ten days later, your conclusion would be that the NATO bombing had absolutely no effect on their leaving the village, when in fact that was exactly the reason why they left the village."

Doctor Ball would assume that they couldn't possibly have left because of the threat to the barracks situated down the road so there had to be some other reason for leaving Kosovo.

As professor Steele remarked rather understatedly "(the analysis) is relying on temporal relationships and making the assumption that a cause must precede its effect, thus he rules out, say, NATO strikes as being causal of refugee flow because they took place after the flow began. However, it may be that one cannot apply this kind of logic to human beings, since we are somewhat capable of anticipating future events."



My! The number of times that Dr Ball must get caught in the rain. He only takes the umbrella with him from home if it's already raining. Dark ominous clouds on the horizon and weather forecasts warning of a torrential downpour mean nothing to him.

N) Gridlock

Doctor Ball claimed that over half of all the refugees crossed into Albania the same day they left their house. This is extremely unlikely to say the least. Yugoslav forces often had to reroute ethnic Albanian convoys because of anti terror operations were underway and it was simply too dangerous.

Particularly true of the Kosovo/Albanian border where the KLA had ordered a complete mobilization of their forces and at the same time the Yugoslav forces were reinforcing the border in expectation of a NATO land offensive. Huge border skirmishes occurred throughout the Spring of 1999.

For example, Ms Aferdita Hajrizi - testified on the 26th April 2002 - left her house on the 24th of March 1999 and hid for a few days in Mitrovica. She joined a column of refugees on the 28th March and stay for three days in the village of Zhabar. She then returned to Mitrovica. Several days later she got on a bus and was transported to Montenegro.